Autumn 2012 – FNSC9007

Assignments for the lecture series Finnish Contemporary History (FNSC9007, 2012)

Is the Finnish Farm Still Relevant?

Nathan Tuttle

The opening scene of Finnish director Aki Kaurismäki’s 1999 film Juha portrays the rural lifestyle and Finnish countryside as nothing less than utopian. A farmer named Juha and his wife Marja, accompanied by a peppy melody, are all smiles on their way to the market. The market has a very communal atmosphere to it, and at the end of the day the happy couple leaves with a nice sum of money from vegetable sales. It is a simple, quiet, fulfilling, and community-oriented way of life that puts farming families in touch with nature and each other. Beautiful pastoral landscapes are the backdrop for scenes of hard work, love, cooperation, and more. That is, until the slick and sinister bachelor Shemeikka lures Marja into the city and an urban lifestyle. Marja’s life in the city is best characterized as chaotic; people are cold, relationships are superficial, and evil lurks everywhere.

Certainly Kaurismäki’s film can be interpreted in a myriad of ways, but one thing that is undeniable is the strong tie between Finnish national identity and “the agrarian ideal.” At the turn of the century, Juha poses an interesting question to its audience: is the Finnish farm and farm lifestyle still relevant today?

It is important to begin to answer this question with some facts about farming in Finland. In the “northernmost agricultural country” in the world, only about 8% of land area is farmland (MMM 2009). Night frost, frequent rainfall, clay soil in the south, harsh temperatures, a short growing season, seasonal extremes, and the costs associated with each of these challenges means that the most farms harvest cereals or dairy depending on the region (MMM 2009). In most cases, agricultural income is not enough, and also needs to be supplemented by a certain amount of forestry as well (Heinonen 2009). Really the only advantage of farming in Finland is that pests rarely present an issue and therefore, not many chemicals or pesticides are needed (MMM 2009). Finnish farms are mostly family owned, small, and spread out all over the country.

In the early 1960s there were about 330,000 farms in Finland, in 1995 (pre-EU accession) there were 95,562, and in 2011 that number was down to 61,200 (MMM 2008, 2009; Niemi 2012). Each year the number of farms in Finland decreases by 3%, and Jyrki Niemi, agricultural economist, predicts that by “2020, there will be less than 40,000 farms left” (MTT, 2005). Agriculture accounts for only 1% of gross domestic product in Finland, but about 5% of the workforce are farmers (Heinonen 2009). According to Yrjö Venna, “Finnish farmers were the losers in the EU-game.” He cites new competition from Central European farmers and a struggle to cope with new EU producer prices as the main reason most Finnish farmers voted “No” on the EU-accession referendum (Venna).

Armed with these facts, one cannot help but wonder if the agrarian is still the ideal in Finland. Farming requires a huge amount of subsidies, and the days of the small family farm seem numbered. Finland is now known internationally for its growing technology industry (think Nokia, Angry Birds, etc.). In many ways farming in Finland makes about as much sense as farming in Alaska. However, even if farming is not the most practical economic endeavor for 21st century Finland there is ample evidence suggesting that its importance transcends practicality.

The Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry states that the “riches of the rural cultural and heritage landscapes” are why Finnish family farms are worth preserving. They also make the argument that a “pleasant, well managed countryside provides the setting for a diversity of other rural industries, such as tourism” (MMM 2009). David Kirby, in his 2006 book A Concise History of Finland, echoes this approach to the Finnish farm and rural countryside as a primarily aesthetic asset: “The number of [rural] summer cottages more than quadrupled during the last forty years of the twentieth century, and is now approaching the half-million mark.” Perhaps another indicator is the outrage that the popular Finnish vodka brand Koskenkorva encountered when they attempted to change their label from a picturesque countryside landscape to something more modern. “The peaceful rural scene on the label evokes the secure, bucolic atmosphere so sacred to all,” says Kolbe in her 2008 edition of Portraying Finland. Needless to say, Koskenkorva changed the label back immediately.

The Finns have made one things clear: they love the farmland. Even as the number of farms dwindles, the strong connection to the agrarian persists. Are Finnish farms and a farming lifestyle still relevant today? I think the answer has to be a resounding “yes!” Perhaps the relevance is of a different nature. No longer a primary method of earning a living, the countryside is now a nostalgic place – a place that takes Finns back to their roots. As long as there is Finland, though, there will be Finnish farms regardless of the economic or geographic challenges.

The Kalmar Union (1397-1523)

Joana Skowronek

Originating as long ago as the 14th century, the Kalmar Union can be understood as the precursor of solidarity in Scandinavia. It was a series of attempts to unite the four Nordic countries of Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland under a single crown aimed at peaceful cooperation and coexistence. Thereby, the territory of Finland was part of the Kingdom of Sweden while the other two countries constituted two autonomous realms. However, several personal unions formed until the 16th century were marked by bloody conflicts and rebellions.

The Kalmar Union arose from Margrethe I, the daughter of King Valdemar of Denmark, who was married to King Håkon VI of Norway and who succeeded in putting her son Oluf on the throne of Denmark at the age of five after her father’s death. Yet, King Oluf died twelve years later in 1387. Subsequently, Margrethe managed to be accepted as legitimate regent of the kingdom (Gustafsson, 2006, p. 207; Tumblr, 2012). In 1397 she arranged for her great-nephew Erik of Pomerania to become the king of the three realms, being crowned at Kalmar, Sweden (Simpson, 1982, p. 193). Since Margrethe I stayed in power until her death in 1412, she additionally convened a meeting of the councils of the three countries, the so-called Rigsraads (Britannica (1), 2012). Together they drew up two documents, one of which was supposed to lay down the union’s terms (ibid.). One of the drafts has been called coronation letter or Kroningsbrevet and “expressed a political programme of  regimen regale, a monarchical view of how a state should be run” (Gustafsson, 2006, p. 207). The other document, the union letter or Unionsbrevet, represented regimen politicum, i.e. a limited form of monarchy with each realm retaining its own legislation and supervised by its own council. While Margrethe I favoured the first document, the councillors supported the second. In the end, she prevailed so that the union letter was never legitimised and the maintenance of the monarchic rule was ensured (ibid., p. 208; Danmarkshistorien, 2012).

Although Denmark constituted the centre of the Kalmar Union, each country kept its own laws and customs to which Margrethe I had objected in the union letter, as she feared that this would impede the complete merging of Scandinavia (Danmarkshistorien, 2012; Britannica (1), 2012). Consequently, none of the drafts seems to have been legally accepted by the three councils. Thus, those two documents have caused a continuous controversial historical debate about the  constitution and political structure of the Kalmar Union to this day (Danmarkshistorien, 2012). Furthermore, Margrethe’s motives for the establishment of the Union also display a matter in dispute. Some historians have argued that she had planned the amalgamation of Scandinavia long in advance whereas others have claimed that she spontaneously acted upon the critical situation of her dynasty and grasped at a  convenient opportunity to master it (Simpson, 1982, p. 193). And still others have been of the opinion that “it was intended to gather the resources of Scandinavia in defence against German interests, especially the Hanse” (Gustafsson, 2006, p. 207). It will never be possible to pinpoint the intentions which Margrethe I pursued and which prompted the political elites of the three realms to endorse a personal union. Nevertheless, they must have suspected a benefit behind the creation of the Kalmar Union (ibid.). Beyond that, there probably was a desire for joint governmental action among the three kingdoms (Simpson, 1982, p. 193).

When Erik of Pomerania came into power, he continued the centralisation policy of his great-aunt for the countries he now ruled (Danmarkshistorien, 2012). However, concerning Sweden he made the mistake of not keeping Margrethe’s promise to protect the aristocrats’ political influence and prerogatives (Sverigeturism, 2009). Moreover, he placed Danes and Germans in important positions in the administration and society, breaking another promise by his aunt (ibid.; Britannica (2), 2012). In addition to this, Erik raised the taxes not only in Sweden, but also in Norway, which worsened both their domestic conditions. This caused a rebellion by the Swedish peasants in 1434, which was led by Engelbrekt Engelbrektsson and supported by the aristocracy. The peasantry in Norway also sparked off a riot in 1436 followed by an uprising in Denmark. As violent unrest and armed conflicts increased, Erik was deposed in 1439 by the Danish and Swedish councils (Danmarkshistorien, 2012; Sverigeturism, 2009).

Although Karl Knutson had become the regent of Sweden, Christoffer of Bavaria, Erik’s nephew, took over the power over the three realms from 1440 onward, being elected by the Danish council. Knutson was given the territory of Finland as a fief in return for his waiving of the throne. Subsequently, the Swedish council also accepted Christoffer as the new king (Britannica (2), 2012). Yet, Christoffer died in 1448 while still young and did not leave any children behind  (Danmarkshistorien, 2012). Historians opine that the dissolution of the Union of Kalmar began with the time of the peasants’ revolts or with Christoffer’s sudden death at the latest (Gustafsson, 2006, p. 206). Albeit the Union formally ended on 6 June 1523 with the election of Gustav Vasa as Sweden’s king only (ibid., p. 211), there permanently had been violent conflicts before which gradually contributed to the divergence of the three kingdoms. Nonetheless, there remains some controversy about the effects of its long division process and about what the Kalmar Union actually was. In this context, some have argued that the Union laid the administrative basis for the formation of the Scandinavian states (Andrén, 1989, p. 607). As Gustafsson (2006) claims the Union of Kalmar does not appear to be “only a failure but … a political and mental structure that had an important impact although it did not develop into a national state” (p. 217).

Thus, even though the Union itself did not develop into a state alternative, it provided for the foundations and structures of two states, Sweden and Denmark-Norway, that should prevail in Northern Europe for the upcoming 300 years (ibid., p. 216). Above all, the Union of Kalmar has represented the first embodiment of Scandinavian affinity which included Finland, despite being a far cry from the establishment of its own sovereign state.
 

Finnish-German relations during the Interim Peace

 Albert Mäkitalo

Finnish-German relations had their starting point in the years of 1917/1918 during a time of strain for both nations. The Finnish state had just been founded and experienced a civil war while the German Reich was involved in a war that would lead to its eventual demise. To some degree, the Finnish state, as it came into existence after the civil war, was part of the legacy of the great power ambitions of the German empire that was about to dissolve. In Finland, the German involvement helped to bring into power a pro-Western, pro-German as well as anti-Russian and anti-socialist Government. However, under the impression of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and the ensuing internal problems that Germany faced, German interests in the region would fade in the following years. The Germany of the 20’s and 30’s would moreover lose its initial popularity in Finland. Especially the Rise of the Nazi’s was followed with suspicion by an increasingly pro-Western Finland that was bound by trade to England. From 1935 on, Finland would search for allies in Scandinavia rather than in central Europe.

Nonetheless, the USSR would become increasingly suspicious of the Finnish intentions due to ongoing contacts between Finnish and German military officials that were a result of the ties that had been established through the Jääkärit. The Finnish rejection of a non-aggression pact, offered by Germany in 1939, did not sooth Soviet suspicions that would eventually lead to the Winter War. The Winter War was in many ways a turning point for Finnish politics. The West, Scandinavia and especially the League of Nations had not been able to protect Finland. And although Germany had grown exceedingly unpopular throughout Finnish society due to its pact with the USSR, the Finnish government made a strong turn towards the right and towards Germany after the Peace of Moscow. An important role at this stage may have played a confidential note by Göring, the commander-in-chief of the German Luftwaffe, during the Winter War that urged Finland to accept Soviet peace conditions with the promise of later redemption. But even though the mood in Finland was set for revenge after the war, Finland did not immediately fall into the hands of Nazi Germany which in turn frustrated Finnish approaches to gain support. This is strikingly shown by the negotiations between Finland and Sweden for a political union that would have given some relief to Finland’s isolated position. But this incentive was faced with the opposition of both Germany and the USSR, who had their own plans for Finland. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact from 1939 was from the beginning only conceived of as a temporary agreement that would give its participants time to strengthen their respective positions. Hitler’s ultimate goal had always been the destruction of Bolshevism and an expansion of German territory to the east.

In the spring of 1940, Germany’s interests were increasingly directed towards Scandinavia and Finland. Allied plans of a landing in Norway threatened Germany’s vital interests in Swedish iron ore and the Finnish nickel mines in the Petsamo area. The German industry, which already experienced shortages, heavily depended on the Finnish resources of nickel which were the largest in Europe. Furthermore, Finland had an enormous strategic value for the German operation Barbarossa, the manifestation of Hitler’s long known announcement to crush Bolshevism and to secure to the ‘Germanic race’ Lebensraum im Osten (territory in the east). It was shortly after the fall of France in June 1940 that Germany and Finland signed a trade agreement that promised Germany the greater part of the Finnish nickel production despite earlier claims by the Soviets. Germany certainly had more room to maneuver after the swift victories in the West. Hitler was thus able to put aside at least some of the former cautiousness towards the USSR. But also the Finnish population must have been impressed by the German victories which facilitated a spread of fascist ideology in certain layers of the Finnish society. That Finnish politics made a shift towards the Axis powers is also reflected in the suspension of payments to the League of Nations and the recognition of Slovakia.

Within the context of the nickel question, Germany put Finland repeatedly into diplomatically impossible situations in which Finland had to prolong and obstruct negotiations with the Soviets on behalf of German interests, without allowing Finnish diplomats to mention the German backing. Facing external strain by the Soviet Union as well as internal difficulties, the nickel question appeared as Finland’s only security valve in the spring and summer of 1940 in that it involved a German interest in Finnish security. The pressure on Finland was even made worse through the German occupation of Denmark and Norway that put Finnish foreign trade under German control. The Finnish handling of the nickel question reflects some important issues about the Finnish foreign policy of the time. Firstly, there is a reluctance to make any more concessions to the Soviet Union and thus also a general unwillingness to cooperate with its eastern neighbor. This goes hand in hand with a drift towards Germany which encouraged Finnish opposition to the Soviet Union. Within a larger context, Finland continued its policy of the time before the Winter War which was anti-Russian, anti-socialist as well as pro-Western and pro-German. But Finnish policy also made a shift from defensive policies towards a more defiant and offensive policy that somehow fits the German expansionism in Europe in those years.

Jonas divides Finnish-German cooperation into three phases which start with Finnish efforts to gain German support after the Peace of Moscow. This was followed by an inclusion of the Finnish economy within a larger German economic framework – as was exemplified above by the nickel question – and a final military collaboration, beginning in 1941, that eventually led to a joint attack on the Soviet Union.

Military cooperation already started in the August of 1940 when Mannerheim and Ryti agreed to the transit of German troops through Finland to Norway in return for German arm deliveries. The so-called Veltjens-Agreement was not only a German breach of the non-aggression-pact with the Soviet Union but also a gross circumvention of Finnish democratic institutions. In December 1940 Finnish-German military cooperation reached a new quality when Finnish military officials were made acquainted with the German plans to invade the USSR. The revelation of operation Barbarossa, one of Germany’s most important military secrets, is a sign for the closeness of the military relations between the two countries at this stage. The whole affair is also a further step away from democratic processes in Finland as it is the military leadership that takes Finland’s fate into its hands. The circumvention of democratic institutions, like the parliament, at these early stages before the actual attack on the Soviet Union is certainly a result of the secrecy that was involved in the whole matter. But one must also admit that Finnish democracy did not work quite well at a point, where decisions were made that would affect the whole country and the lives of so many people. In the end it was only a small circle of influential people in the Finnish government and military that precipitated Finland into a new war. Finnish soldiers and civilians would have to pay dearly for their government’s decisions.

  • Condon, Richard W. 1974. Moscow parenthesis: a study of Finnish-German relations 1940-1941. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms.
  •  Hitler, Adolf. 1934. Mein Kampf. Zwei Bände in einem Band. München: Zentralverlag der NSDAP.
  •  Jonas, Michael. 2012. “The Politics of an Alliance: Finland in Nazi Foreign Policy and War Strategy.” In: Kiinnunen, Tiina and Ville Kivimäki (eds.). Finland in World War II: history, memory, interpretations. Leiden: Brill, 93-138.
  •  Krosby, Hans Peter. 1968. Finland, Germany and the Soviet Union 1940-1941. Madison, Milwaukee, and London: The University of Wisconsin Press.
  • Lundin, C. Leonard. 1957. Finland in the Second World War. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
  • Meinander, Henrik. 2012. “Finland and the Great Powers in World War II: Ideologies, Geopolitics, Diplomacy.“ In: Kiinnunen, Tiina and Ville Kivimäki (eds.). Finland in World War II: history, memory, interpretations. Leiden: Brill, 49-91.
  • Ueberschär, Gerd R. 1978. Hitler und Finnland 1939-1941: die deutsch-finnischen Beziehungen während des Hitler-Stalin-Paktes. Wiesbaden: Steiner.

The consequences of the Tilsit Treaty on Finland
Aurélia Boscher

The Tilsit Treaty (1809) is often known because of its consequences on the Prussian Empire, but also had huge consequences of the faith of Finland. Finland, which was an integrant part of the Swedish Kingdom since the 13th century, became an automous entity under the Russian Empire. How did the Tilsit Treaty influence the Finnish History ? First, I will describe the Tilsit Treaty and then I will talk about its consequences on Finland.

The Tilsit Treaty was part of the fight between the European power politics of the Napoleonic era. In 1805, Napoleon marched across Europe and his army defeated both Austrian and Russian Armies. The French army also defeated Prussians when they entered the war against Napoleon during the Battle of Jena in October 1806. When the army had a decisive victory over the Russians at Friedland, in June 1807, the former russian tzar, Alexander I, decided to sue for peace. Thus, the Czar declared that « only an alliance between France and Russia would guarantee the hapiness and the peace of the world.

The first meeting between the two emperors was held on June 25th 1807 at Tilsit on a raft in the middle of the river Niemen. This place was decided because it was the dividing line between the two armies. Hence, it was a neutral territory. For the emperors,this treaty was a way to reach an
agreement on their respective « spheres of influence ». The main objective of Napoleon was to get the full support of Russia against England. Napoleon was ready to make some concessions because Alexander declared that he was not opposed to recognize Napoleon’s conquests, even if it could become a future menace to Russia. On the other side, the Czar Alexander wanted to receive a part of the Ottoman Empire – if this one would be divided – in order to pursue his own policy in the Balkan Peninsula. He also wanted to retain as much Prussian territory as possible and create a
buffer zone in the West with the the seizure of Finland from Sweden. It was a strategic necessity for Russia because of the proximity of St. Petersburg from Sweden. This country had an alliance with the British and the Czar saw the possibility for England to block the Gulf of Finland. He wanted to attempt to make the Gulf of Finland inacessible to enemy fleets.

Afterward, it is interesting to know that the King of Prussia, Friedrich Wilhehm, was there during the second meeting held on June 26th with the two other emperors. However, he has not his word to say for his weak position after his defeats. The Czar Alexander wanted to avoid any
unnecessary Prussian humiliation but Napoleon imposed a brutal decision on July 9th when the treaties were ratified. They were several effects to those meetings. The first article declared the armistice and the cessation of hostilities betwen the concerned countries. Then, Prussia was spared
and lost one third of its territory. Prussia also had to pay a war contribution, which fed a revenge desire. Then, Napoleon promised to act as a mediator between Turkey and Russia and, should this mediation fail, to come to the aid of Russia by fighting the Ottoman Empire. And eventually, the Czar Alexander promised that he would enter Napoleon’s Continental System against England if she refused to make peace.

This last point had a huge consequence for Finland because a war of Russia against England would have resulted into a war against Sweden, and that is what happened. Firstly, Russia presented a virtual ultimatum on January 11th 1808 in order to wean Sweden away from the British alliance,
because of its proximity from the Russian capital. However, this ultimatum was unanswered and war was declared by Russia on February 22th. An army of 24 000 men invaded Finland, opposing Swedish-Finns force of 20 000 men. The Russians swept over the country and an armistice was
finally signed on September 29th.

As a result, Finland was no longer handed back by Sweden after the conquest of 1809. As I wrote before, the main interest of Finland for Russia was the protection of its capital and the certainty of an access to the Baltic Sea. However, even if Finland as such did not interest Russia,
this had a huge consequence of the country. Finland gained the « elevation to the national status » thanks to the proclamation by the Czar and by its relative independance, became a model for Russian liberal politicies. This differed from the 18th century, in which Finland became a peripheral
region within the Swedish Kingdom. Moreover, Finland was allowed to retain its own legislation, its own institutions and its own central administration. This hugely diverged from the Swedish centralized rule. Plus, Helsinki became in 1812 the new capital instead of Turku which was the center of the province during the Swedish period.. This was a new significative change because Stockholm was the seat of government for Finns until 1809.

To conclude, if the annexation of Finland by Russia in 1809 was mainly aimed in order to create a buffer zone and was only caused by strategic interest of the Empire, it allowed Finland to create its own Diet and administration, called the Finnish Grand Duchy. And above all, a Finnish
national identity started to develop after 1809 because the idea of nation – consciousness of belonging to a lasting political entity – could develop after the setting up of a state.

  • Peacock, HL: A History of Modern Europe, 1789-1981
  • Klinge, Matti: A Brief History of Finland

The Way to Finnish Independence

Janne Sandra Schorer

The Finnish Independence was declared on December 6 in 1917.

It seems that this part of Finnish history can be understood much better, by dealing with the way, how the independence came into the minds of Finnish politicians and people and how they fought for it and implemented it in the end, than by just analyzing the declaration of independence itself. This, of course, can be done after one confronted the way to Finnish Independence. And this Essay tries to retrace exact this way, the way of the Finland from a grand duchy in the Russian Empire, to a state with its own government and declaration of independence.

A good starting point is Russia in the late 19th century. Finland belonged, as an autonomous Grand Duchy, to the Russian Empire since 1809 and therefore Russia decided about the Finnish fate during this times this essay will mainly deal with. While the Russian Empire fought the Crimean War and the Turkish War 1853-1856 and 1877-1878, their security concerns had to shift to central and northern Europe in 1990, where the German Empire, united and founded in 1881, was about to rise. Russia signed military contracts, first with France and then with Great Britain. With this shift of attention Finland, which was widely left in peace until then, also came back to the focus and Russia could hardly leave a land, which was located in such an important place between Russia and Europe, as Finland was, on its own any longer.

Already in the 1880s Alexander III made concrete plans to limit the Finnish autonomy. He named F.L. Heiden as a new governor-general of the Grand Duchy of Finland. In the following years Heiden created or changed many laws and followed a policy of imperialization. He wanted for example increase the use of Russian language in Finnish administrative institutions. But all in all he and Alexander III agreed, that adapting Finland to Russia must be a very slow but long-lasting process, to not upset the Finnish people too much and risk a segregation war. But Alexander III died in 1894 and his son Nicholas II became czar of the Russian Empire. He was known as a much weaker and suggestible ruler than his father was. So he quick fell under the influence of people who wanted a much quicker adaption of Finland to Russia and again a new governor-general was named in 1898, Nikolai Bobrikov. He published the February Manifesto of 1899, which mainly attacked Finnish legislative institutions, as they weren’t allowed anymore to make laws on their own, but everything they developed had to go through Russian legislative process, where the Finnish Senate, Estates-General and office of the governor-general only had an advisory role. In 1900 the Language Manifesto was promulgated, which said, that Russian should be the Language of administration and the judiciary within ten years. However the Finns kept on talking Finnish with their authorities and in 1905 Finnish had widely replaced Swedish in public institutions. That was not too bad for the Russian emperor, as they wanted to cut the link between Finland and Northern Europe. In 1901 a new military conscription law was instituted, that changed the extraordinary treatment of Finnish military servant, who should be left in Finland. With this changing they could be sent everywhere in the Empire, also across the Russian border to fight for Russia.

While the Russians believed that those changed were fair and for protecting Finland, the Finns more and more saw themselves as a separate state. So a wave of protest rose after the February Manifesto and one out of three Finnish adults signed a petition where they kindly asked for a change in policy. Unfortunately Nicholas II refused to meet the delegation who brought the address to him.

At the same time the political spectrum in Finland was divided in the question how to deal with Russia. There were appeasers and constitutionalists. The appeasers united in Old Finns parties made a distinction between state and nation. They argued, a nation can exist without a state and Finland should be therefore loyal to Russia, in the hope that Russia would respect Finnish autonomy in exchange and leave them alone. In a rebellion against Russia they saw the risk of Russians destroying the Finnish culture in case of defeat of the Finns.

The other way to think about the Russian question was the way the Young Finns Party did. They thought state and nation as inalterable linked, a basis of Finnish culture must be an autonomous Finnish state. This movement gathered a lot of support from other parties in Finland, because they adapted a socially and economically liberal view and the language question. So there stance got backed by the Swedish Party and the Social Democratic Party. But the constitutionalists where divided in two other movements. One part thought it would be best to practice peaceful civil disobedience. They for example refused to go to the Russian army when they were called. For another part of the movement that wasn’t enough. They believed in a more violent way to segregate Finland from Russia. All over the country they founded shooting clubs and organized themselves as an armed opposition. On June 16, 1904, Eugen Schauman, member of this armed opposition shot the governor-general Bobrikov and killed himself, leaving a list with Bobrikov’s illegal actions.

In the following years Russia had a lot of trouble by their selves. After the defeat in Russo-Japanese war 1905 the First Russian Revolution took place, followed by four years of extreme political disorder. In November 1905 a general strike even engulfed Finland. Nicholas II replaced the Old Finn majority in senate with constitutionalists, suspended the February Manifesto and promised a more representative legislature to the Finns. In 1907 ten times as many people voted in the elections for parliament, as have done before for the old legislature. That meant a huge success for the Social Democratic Party and the Agrarian League in this election. It showed that agrarian and industrial workers and medium-sized farmers had a real political agenda in the country. But while Finland seemed to be a democratic state then, it wasn’t. Most legislative power was still with the grand duke and the emperor had an absolute veto over anything that passed the legislature. So the imperialization was in fact just renewed. In 1912 Nicholas II signed the Equality Law, which said, that every Russian subject in Finland had rights equal to those of Finns. Until then, they had had the status of aliens. From then on the czar began to fill the Senate with Russian militaries who had lived in Finland for some time. He made Finland contribute to the defense of the Russian Empire, by calling for example for ten million Finnish marks in 1909. Seven years later, this sum reached 17 million Finnish marks, which were transferred to Russian funds.

At the same time Finland was in a economical crisis. From 1820 to 1890 the population of the country doubled, what left many people without land. Those became tenant farmers, what means, that they are working on land, they don’t own, but had rented. In 1901, 65 percent of the Finnish agrarian outcome came from such tenant farmers. The price for grain, the main agrarian product in Finland lowered and landowners increased demands on their tenant farmers, who had no or just a few legal protection. The industrialization, which came to Finland in the 1910th wasn’t extensive enough to solve the problem of landlessness, by creating jobs for the landless peasants. But it was on the other side significant enough to create a new group of socially underprivileged industrial workers.

Then in August 1914 World War I erupted and brought new crises to Finland. In 1916 they experienced a shortage of food and many workers lost their jobs. This explains why the Social Democratic Party won the total majority during elections for the parliament in the same year. Workers were unsatisfied and clearly voted for a change in politics. Meanwhile, the political system in Russia was really about to change. From March 1917 provisional governments lead the Empire. In this government many members of this government had sympathies for a Finnish autonomy. They formed a new Senate, where the Russian officials were replaced with Finnish people. That can be recognized as the first time, Finland had its own government consisting just of Finnish Parties, what can be seen as the end of Russian imperialization. All of those parties in the Parliament agreed in the wish to negotiate a new autonomy or even independence for Finland with the new Russian ruler. Finland was free to determine its own future for the first time ever. So the members of Parliament began to argue about a new organization of Finland and in July 1917 they proposed the Enabling Act, which should make the Parliament the supreme body of the state, responsible for everything except from foreign and defense policy, what should be left for the Russian authorities. If there had been a majority of Bolsheviks in a Russian government in this time, they might have agreed with it, but the provisional government dissolved the Finnish Parliament and called for new elections. In October elections of this year the Social Democratic Party lost their majority to non-socialist parties. At this time the Social Democratic Party split itself into a reformist and a revolutionary part and the situation between leftist and red workers and conservative, so-called white landowners became more violent.

But when the situation in Russia changed again, with Lenin and the Bolsheviks taking over the government in November 1917, Finnish Parliament reacted very quickly and passed an Enabling Act, similar to the one from July, on November 15. Twelve days later, the caretaker Senate cleared the way for a non-Socialist Senate under Pehr Evind Svinhufvud. The Social Democratic Party would have liked to wait and negotiate with the Bolsheviks over a Finland within the Russian Border but the non-Socialists where scared of Socialism and so they worked out a declaration of independence, which was approved by the new Parliament with 100 to 88 votes at December 6 in 1917.

  • Kirby, David: A Concise History of Finland, Cambridge, 2006
  • Klinge, Matti: A Brief History of Finland, Helsinki, 1988
  • Lavery,Jason: The History of Finland, Westport, 2006

A long-standing President: Urho Kekkonen

Nina Pappert

Urho Kaleva Kekkonen influenced politics as the Finnish President for 25 years, from 1956 to 1981. He understood the importance of Finnish neutrality and thus, for him, [m]aintaining good relations with the Soviet Union became an overriding priority, even an obsession” (Kirby, 2006, p. 246). But how was he capable of consolidating his power to such a great extent that Soviet leaders trusted him and gave him the freedom to move Finland closer to its western neighbours? And what implications had his power on Finnish politics?

Born in north-eastern Finland in 1900 and raised “with the social-radical traditions of Finnish nationalism” (Kirby, 2006, p. 248), Kekkonen inherited the desire to change society at his birth. He understood nationalism as an ethical principle, which would direct people’s future rather than tie them to their past (ibid.). This stance on politics made him join the Agrarian League, where he represented the farmers with whom he shared anti-Communist and nationalist views (Singleton, 1982, pp. 90-91). Kekkonen soon ran for President, but lost to Juho Paasikivi, becoming Prime Minister in 1950.  In 1956 then, Kekkonen ran for presidency against the Social-Democrat Karl-August Fagerholm and won by a very narrow margin.

Being Prime Minister under the presidency of Paasikivi influenced Kekkonen in a way that much of his political strategy was based on the Paasikivi line, which emphasised a special relationship with the Soviet Union in order for independent Finland to survive. However, Kekkonen took this strategy a step further and envisaged a broader vision for Finland. He believed that Finland had to shed its ‘low-profile’ foreign policy and adopt a more ‘pro-active’ policy. At the same time, Finland needed to demonstrate “her usefulness as a good neighbour” to the Soviet Union as this would provide for “a wider freedom in international politics” (Singleton, 1998, pp. 143-144). Hence, Kekkonen envisaged a bridge-building policy for Finland (Kirby, 2006, p. 204).

During his presidency, Kekkonen encountered various situations where his authority was challenged. Two situations were particularly striking because out of these crises Kekkonen was able to further consolidate his power. The first incident was the ‘Nightfrost crisis’ of 1958. In 1958, Fagerholm’s third cabinet was formed; a government that was critical of Kekkonen and that did not include the Communists, even though the SKDL had won a lot of votes in the election. The Soviet Union disapproved of this government and sanctioned Finland politically and economically. To calm the situation, Kekkonen demanded that his followers left the government, thereby undermining Fagerholm’s cabinet (Karsh, 1986, p. 272). Kekkonen understood that he needed to strengthen the Paasikivi line and keep a positive relationship to the Soviet Union.

The second crisis occurred three years later, in 1961. The so-called ‘note-crisis’ was triggered by the Soviet Union passing a note to Finland, insisting on the military consultation clause of the YYA Treaty. It was the only time that the Soviets proposed to activate this clause. As the note was passed during a presidential election campaign, the Soviet Union demanded to withdraw the note only if Kekkonen was re-elected. Yet, Kekkonen could quickly solve the crisis by meeting personally with Khrushchev in Novosibirsk (Singleton, 1998, p. 145). At the private meeting, Kekkonen achieved the withdrawal of the request for military consultations and obtained Khrushchev’s trust for his policy of neutrality. At the same time, Kekkonen’s opponent in the presidential elections withdrew from the election, ensuring that Kekkonen was re-elected as President (Karsh, 1986, p. 274).

These two crises strengthened Kekkonen’s power in Finland’s domestic politics and ensured him the trust of the Soviet Union. “The Soviet leaders had identified Kekkonen as the man they could do business with” and also funded his election campaigns (Singleton, 1998, p. 145). With his ‘good neighbourliness’ policy, Kekkonen was able to gain recognition for Finland’s neutrality by the Soviet Union, which gave him a greater leverage in his relations to the West. Instead of keeping foreign policy at a ‘low profile’, in the 1970s, Kekkonen involved Finland in various UN peacekeeping operations and brought it closer to Western Europe (1982, p. 92). In his relations to Western Europe, Kekkonen’s greatest successes were the signing of a free-trade agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 and holding of the European Security Conference in Helsinki in 1975. At the conference, Finland could demonstrate its capability of being “an honest broker in the Cold War”, helping to produce the Helsinki Accords of 1975 (1998, p. 145). The conference is probably the best example of Kekkonen’s bridge-building policy. With his western-approach in foreign policy, Kekkonen managed to reduce Soviet influence on Finnish politics and brought his country closer to its western neighbours, both in the EEC and the Nordic Council.

Until 1981, Kekkonen was re-elected as President quite easily, especially due to his popularity within the Soviet Union. Yet, his health declined rapidly so that he had to resign from office in October 1981. By then, Kekkonen and the position of President had become the real centre in Finnish politics. No other Finnish President before or after Kekkonen had as much divided the political arena into followers and non-followers and had gained such great influence over politics. Actually, after the resignation of Kekkonen, the power of the President was again limited, transferring many powers to the Prime Minister and his cabinet.

Although Kekkonen has brought Finland closer to Western Europe and freed it from the Soviet sphere, it is nonetheless noteworthy that Kekkonen was at the same time a very controversial figure. His role, especially in the two above-mentioned crises, is not completely transparent. A question that arises is whether he was responsible for triggering the note-crisis? Moreover, Kekkonen had often been criticised by Western politicians for being too close to the Soviet leadership, perhaps even being a puppet for them. Thus, this shows, that even though Kekkonen brought great political achievements to Finland, his style of conducting politics remains disputed.

  • Karsh, E. (1986). Finland: Adaptation and Conflict. International Affairs , 62 (2), 265-278.
  • Kirby, D. (2006). A Concise History of Finland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Singleton, F. (1998). A Short History of Finland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Singleton, F. (1982). Finland after Kekkonen. The World Today , 38 (3), 90-96.

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